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Prof. Dr. Robin Christmann

Professur für Volkswirtschaftslehre, insb. Angewandte Mikroökonomik

Studiengangsverantwortung Business Economics

  • Akquisition von Unternehmen und Dozenten
  • Forschungskooperationen, insb. Promotionen
  • Drittmittelförderung
  • Bibliothek
  • Forschungs-Workshops
  • Ansprechpartner für Studierenden / Unternehmen für Wissenstransfer
  • Forschungsbudget, Forschungsfreiräume

0511 95784 41 E-Mail schreiben

Curriculum Vitae
Seit 01/2020 Vizepräsident für Forschung, Leibniz-Fachhochschule
Seit 2015 Hauptamtlicher Professor für Volkswirtschaftslehre an der Leibniz-Fachhochschule
Seit 2015 Dozent für Wirtschaftspolitik an der Helmut-Schmidt-Universität, Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg
2015 Dozent für ‚Macroeconomics‘ an der Hamburg School of Business Administration
2015 Promotion zum Thema „The role of judicial self-interest in contracts and litigation“
2009-2015 Externer Mitarbeiter am Lehrstuhl für Politische Ökonomik und Empirische Wirtschaftsforschung (Prof. Dr. Michael Berlemann)
2011-2014 Disziplinarvorgesetzter in der Offizierausbildung
2011 Auslandseinsatz
2009-2011 Stabsverwendung in einer selbständigen Kompanie
2005-2009 Studium der Volkswirtschaftslehre an der Helmut-Schmidt-Universität, Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg
2002 Eintritt in die Offizierlaufbahn der Bundeswehr

 

 

Forschungsschwerpunkte
  • Ökonomische Analyse des Rechts, insb. Ökonomik von Vertrag und Prozess
  • Vertragstheorie
  • Informationsökonomik & Prinzipal-Agent Beziehungen
  • Mergers & Acquisitions
  • Anwendungen der Spieltheorie
  • Arbeitsmarkt & Arbeitsrecht
Veröffentlichungen

Aufsätze in referierten Fachzeitschriften:

Christmann, Robin (2021). Prosecution and Conviction under Hindsight Biased Information Updating in Adversary Legal Systems. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (forthcoming).

Broere, Mark und Christmann, Robin (2021). Takeovers, Shareholder Litigation, and the Free-riding Problem. International Review of Law and Economics 65: 105951.

Berlemann, Michael & Christmann, Robin (2020). Disposition Time and the Utilization of Prior Judicial Decisions: Evidence from a Civil Law Country. International Review of Law and Economics (forthcoming).

Berlemann, Michael & Christmann, Robin (2019). Determinants of In-Court Settlements: Empirical Evidence from a German Trial Court. Journal of Institutional Economics 15: 143-162.

Berlemann, Michael & Christmann, Robin (2016). Do Judges React to the Probability of Appellate Review? Empirical Evidence from Trial Court Procedures. Applied Economics Letters 23: 202-205.

Christmann, Robin (2015). Tipping the Scales! Settlement, Appeal and the Relevance of Judicial Ambition. Review of Law and Economics 11: 171-207.

Christmann, Robin (2014). No Judge, No Job! Court Errors and the Contingent Labor Contract. European Journal of Law and Economics 38: 409-419.

Weitere Beiträge in Zeitschriften und Sammelbänden:

Berlemann, Michael & Christmann, Robin (2017). Verfahrensdauer im Zivilprozess: 100 Seiten Parteivortrag = 2,7 Monate. In: Legal Tribune Online, 06.09.2017.

Berlemann, Michael & Christmann, Robin&Focken, Niels (2016). Lassen sich Vergleich und Berufung vorhersagen? Deutsche Richterzeitung 02/2016: 62-65.

Diskussionspapiere:

Christmann, Robin (2021). Plea Bargaining and Investigation Effort: Inquisitorial Criminal Procedure as a Three-Player Game. Research Paper No. 9.

Christmann, Robin & Kirstein, Roland (2020). You go First! Coordination Problems and the Standard of Proof in Inquisitorial Prosecution. Research Paper No. 8.

Christmann, Robin (2013). Vertragliche Anreize und die Fehlbarkeit des Richters – Der ungewisse Gang vor Gericht und sein Einfluss auf eine Verhaltenssteuerung im BGB-Vertragsrecht. Working Paper No. 133. Helmut-Schmidt-Universität, Hamburg.

Christmann, Robin (2010). Warum brauchen wir Richter? Working Paper No. 103. Helmut-Schmidt-Universität, Hamburg.

weitere wissenschaftlichen Tätigkeiten

 

  • Erweiterter Vorstand (German Law and Economics Association)
  • Ausschuss für Institutionenökonomik (Verein für Socialpolitik)
  • European Law and Economics Association
  • American Law and Economics Association
  • Research Fellow an der Otto-von-Guericke-Universität Magdeburg
  • Gutachter (peer-review): Applied Economics, European Journal of Law and Economics, Review of Law and Economics, Conference on Empirical Legal Studies Europe, Journal of Institutional Economics, Information Economics and Policy, Review of Economics, Schmalenbachs Zeitschrift für betriebswirtschaftliche Forschung, European Journal of Comparative Economics, Scandinavian Political Studies, CESifo Economic Studies

 

Publikationen

Fachzeitschriften | Berlemann, Michael, Christmann, Robin; Niels Focken
Lassen sich Vergleich und Berufung vorhersagen?
Deutsche Richterzeitung 02/2016: 62-65.
2016

LINK ÖFFNEN
Referierte Fachzeitschriften | Broere, Mark; Christmann, Robin
Takeovers, Shareholder Litigation, and the Free-riding Problem
International Review of Law and Economics 65: 105951.
2021

LINK ÖFFNEN
Referierte Fachzeitschriften | Christmann, Robin
Prosecution and Conviction under Hindsight Biased Information Updating in Adversary Legal Systems.
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 77: 404-427.
2021

LINK ÖFFNEN
Referierte Fachzeitschriften | Berlemann, Michael; Christmann, Robin
Disposition Time and the Utilization of Prior Judicial Decisions: Evidence from a Civil Law Country.
International Review of Law and Economics 62: 105887.
2020

LINK ÖFFNEN
Referierte Fachzeitschriften | Berlemann, Michael; Christmann, Robin
Determinants of In-Court Settlements: Empirical Evidence from a German Trial Court.
Journal of Institutional Economics 15: 143-162.
2019

LINK ÖFFNEN
Referierte Fachzeitschriften | Berlemann, Michael; Christmann, Robin
Do Judges React to the Probability of Appellate Review? Empirical Evidence from Trial Court Procedures.
Applied Economics Letters 23: 202-205.
2016

LINK ÖFFNEN
Referierte Fachzeitschriften | Christmann, Robin
Tipping the Scales! Settlement, Appeal and the Relevance of Judicial Ambition.
Review of Law and Economics 11: 171-207.
2015

LINK ÖFFNEN
Referierte Fachzeitschriften | Christmann, Robin
No Judge, No Job! Court Errors and the Contingent Labor Contract.
European Journal of Law and Economics 38: 409-419.
2014

LINK ÖFFNEN
Preprint | Christmann, Robin
Plea Bargaining and Investigation Effort: Inquisitorial Criminal Procedure as a Three-Player Game
Leibniz FH Research Paper No. 9.
2021

LINK ÖFFNEN
Preprint | Christmann, Robin; Kirstein, Roland
You Go First! Coordination Problems and the Standard of Proof in Inquisitorial Prosecution
Leibniz FH Research Paper No. 8.
2020

The prosecution of criminals is costly, and subject to errors. In contrast to adversarial court procedures, the prosecutor is regarded as an impartial investigator and aide to the judge in inquisitorial justice systems. We show in a sequential prosecution game of a Bayesian court that a strategic interaction between these two benevolent enforcement agents exists where each player hopes to freeride on the other one ́s investigative effort. This gives rise to inefficient equilibria with excessive operating and error costs. Moreover, we will demonstrate that our results are sensitive to the applied standard of proof and that, more disturbingly, the inefficient outcome becomes more probable when the conviction threshold is raised. Applying the concept of ‘beyond reasonable doubt’, we analyze the impact of the standard of proof and other legal policy instruments on type I and type II errors and operating costs.

LINK ÖFFNEN
Preprint | Christmann, Robin
Prosecution and Conviction under Hindsight Bias in Adversary Legal Systems
Leibniz FH Research Paper No. 3.
2018

The plea bargaining mechanism in criminal procedure serves as a favorable screening device, separating between the guilty and the innocent. Previous literature ignored the impact of asymmetric information on prosecutor performance inside the adversarial court, which degrades his bargaining position. This paper presents a sequential prosecution game with endogenous courts, and shows that the successful conviction in court crucially depends on prosecutor ́s beliefs and incentives. If the prosecutor is sufficiently convinced of the defendant ́s guilt ex-ante, he can commit to trial, and the favorable semiseparating equilibrium is obtained. Applying the first formal model of a hindsight biased prosecutor, we find that the negative impact of uncertainty on prosecutor performance is partly mitigated by hindsight bias, and the self-selection of guilty defendants can even improve. Several caveats, like excessive charges, the nature of the case or the quality of investigations by the police force are discussed.

LINK ÖFFNEN
Preprint | Berlemann, Michael; Christmann, Robin
The Role of Precedents on Court Delay
Leibniz FH Research Paper No. 1.
2017

Court delay frustrates economic behavior. Surprisingly, the impact of a coherent jurisdiction for the timely resolution of legal disputes has so far received little attention in civil law countries. Consequently, this paper examines the nexus between court delay and the availability of legal precedents. We model litigation as a two-stage rent seeking game, and find that precedents curb strategic behavior. Thus, the excessive use of party resources in litigation, such as time, is reduced if a precedent is applicable. Using judge-level data of a German trial court, we provide first empirical evidence on the role of precedents for case disposition time and the probability of reversal in a civil law country. Our results show that the availability of precedents significantly contributes to a reduction in delay, and also decreases the probability of reversal. Interestingly, we find no such influence for the citation of legal literature in verdicts.

LINK ÖFFNEN
Preprint | Christmann, Robin
Vertragliche Anreize und die Fehlbarkeit des Richters – Der ungewisse Gang vor Gericht und sein Einfluss auf eine Verhaltenssteuerung im BGB-Vertragsrecht.
HSU Working Paper No. 133.
2013

LINK ÖFFNEN
Preprint | Christmann, Robin
Warum brauchen wir Richter?
HSU Working Paper No. 103.
2010

LINK ÖFFNEN
weitere Beiträge | Berlemann, Michael; Christmann, Robin
Verfahrensdauer im Zivilprozess: 100 Seiten Parteivortrag = 2,7 Monate.
Legal Tribune Online, 06.09.2017.
2017

LINK ÖFFNEN

Kontakt:

Leibniz-Fachhochschule
Expo Plaza 11
30539 Hannover

0511 95784 12 E-Mail schreiben

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